This article offers a study on the plutonomy of the 1% and what their consumptive practices might tell us from the lens of the capital as power framework in IPE. I argue that the differential consumption of dominant owners is an important dimension of the capitalist mode of power for two reasons. First, Nitzan and Bichler argue that the primary driver of accumulation is the desire for differential power symbolically expressed in a magnitude of money. In this article, I argue that there is a secondary drive noted but underdeveloped in their framework and influenced by Veblen: the drive for social status and the display of positionality through differential intraclass consumption. Second, as identified by Kempf, I argue that the consumptive practices of the 1% are helping to lock global society into an unsustainable and ethically indefensible quest for perpetual economic growth. This political project not only alleviates calls for global redistribution but also threatens populations with environmental collapse. The article also introduces the concept of dominant ownership to the lexicon of IPE.
Introduction
that the World Bank estimates global GDP to be about US$ 70 trillion in 2011 and you can get some idea of the magnitude of wealth this tiny minority own. 7 But we have not arrived at the pinnacle just yet. If we use the cut off of US$ 1 billion, we find that there are only 1427 people in the world with such a net worth according to the most have finally arrived at our summit. If we use the cut off of US$ 30 billion dollars, then we would find only 9 people at the pinnacle of the wealth pyramid. This sample of humanity represents only .0000001% of the global population with a total net worth of US$ 422.5 billion or 8% of all billionaire net worth combined. 8 If these 8 men and 1 woman were a country and we compared their net worth to the gross domestic product (GDP) of actually existing countries, their nation would be in 27 th place between Austria and Argentina out of a list of 190 countries ranked by GDP.
9
Based on these statistical observations, the human experiment with capitalism seems to confirm one of Braudel's key insights about capitalist civilization:
Conspicuous at the top of the pyramid is a handful of privileged people. Everything invariably falls into the lap of this tiny elite: power, wealth, a large share of surplus production. . . Is there not in short, whatever the society and whatever the period, an insidious law giving power to the few, an irritating law it must be said, since the reasons for it are not obvious. And yet this stubborn fact, taunting us at every turn. We cannot argue with it: all evidence agrees (1983: 466) .
Despite this measureable concentration of wealth at the top, the field of international political economy (IPE) has been slow to study the global rich -except perhaps in their elite formations and the institutions they capitalize to accumulate ever more pecuniary wealth (van der Pijl 1984 , Gill 1991 2003 , Sklair 2001 , Robinson 2004 , Nitzan and Bichler 2002 , Carroll 2010 . Diverse as the current field of study is today, this is perhaps of little surprise.
Moreover, abstractions such as 'global capital', 'ruling class', 'globalizing elites' or the 'transnational capitalist class' may serve more to obscure rather than clarify matters. This is so, I suggest, for at least four reasons.
First, there is a conventionally accepted split between finance and production in IPE research.
This division suggests that there are capitalists wholly interested in production because they garner their profits from making goods and a separate and analytically distinct camp of capitalists interested in finance since they are assumed to accumulate through speculation and in the process skim unearned rents off the productive economy. However, in the world of absentee ownership, where capital is a vendible commodity and investors capitalize a diversity of income streams, this distinction holds little if any water from the point of view of accumulation. What investors care about is not whether capital is 'productive' or 'financial' but whether the capitalization of their portfolio is rising faster relative to others. 10 A second reason why our abstractions may serve to mystify rather than clarify -mirroring in some senses the neoclassical game of obfuscation by mathematical formalism 11 -is the too often assumed division between 'national' capitalists and 'international' or 'transnational'
capitalists. Since capital is now more vendible than ever, every single investor that
capitalizes part of what Nitzan and Bichler call dominant capital, are by definition global capitalists given that the assets, operations and sales of these firms stretch well beyond a single state. 12 Of course local and national jurisdictions and their laws are still important but they are all facets that enter into the valuation or capitalization of income generating assets.
Third, our abstractions have so far failed to tell us much about the global wealthy both from an analytical and theoretical point of view but also from the standpoint of cultural political economy (Best and Paterson 2009 ). This might seem like an odd claim to make since IPE became concerned that there was too much focus on global capital or global elites and not enough attention given to the everyday agency of ordinary people at lower rungs of the global wealth hierarchy (Davies and Ryner 2006; Langley 2008; Hobson and Seabrooke 2007) . But while this research agenda is incredibly important, we may give pause to ask ourselves whether we truly know the global mega-wealthy?
Fourth, while there is little doubt that as heuristic tools the 'elite' concepts I mentioned above have provided us with new ways to think about transformations in the global political economy -particularly over the last thirty years of disciplinary and perhaps now authoritarian neoliberalism (Gill 1995; Bruff 2011 In order to provide evidence for these arguments, I have divided the paper in the following way. First, while IPE scholars should be familiar with the capital as power framework, I take the time to outline the approach in the first section of this paper so it is clear to the reader how I build on the approach in the subsequent sections. 14 I then move to focus on a neglected study performed by Citigroup to shed further empirical light on consumption and the .2%. In the third section I revisit Veblen's concept of conspicuous consumption in the Theory of the Leisure Class and consider the arms race in housing in the first Gilded Age. This is done to provide some historical and theoretical background for exploring the differential consumption practices of the .2% in what has been called the New Gilded Age (Remnick 2001). The penultimate section considers Kempf's arguments that 'the rich are destroying the earth' while the conclusion summarizes the argument.
The Framework of Capital as Power
Breaking with the neoclassical and Marxist theories of value, the framework of capital as power offers a radical alterative by arguing that capital is not capital goods or surplus abstract labour but commodified differential power. In this framework, capital is not theorized as a mode of production but as a mode of power whereby the dominant organizing principle is not production for the community but the ritual of capitalization for differential pecuniary returns (Nitzan 1998 earnings cannot be explained from the value of machines or their 'productivity' alone. So rather than start from production, Nitzan and Bichler start from the power rooted in ownership over production and social reproduction. But for power to exist in the first place, it has to be relative or differential -regardless of whether we examine it at the micro or macro level. As it turns out, the differential nature of power at the highest levels has been institutionalized and normalized so that capitalists now mathematize virtually the entire social process as a matter of course. Their strategies of accumulation are all related to benchmarks, or the average rate of return in any given sector. The goal, however, is never to meet the average rate of return but to outperform it -to beat the average rate of accumulation. However, before considering this argument at some length, I want to turn to Citigroups's plutonomy thesis for the simple fact that it sheds empirical light on the importance of the .2%
and how they are transforming aspects of the global political economy.
Welcome to the Plutonomy Machine 16
The Richer followed a year later. Taken together, the main aim of the reports is to provide an analysis of current economic trends capable of informing high net worth investment strategies. The thesis advanced in the report is twofold. The first argument is that 'the world is dividing into two blocs -the plutonomies, where economic growth is powered by and largely consumed by the wealthy few, and the rest.' The second argument is far simpler: 'the rich will keep getting richer' (Citigroup 2006: 10) . The authors then read the concept of plutonomy back into history and argue that plutonomies have existed in 'sixteenth century Spain, in seventeenth century Holland, the Gilded Age and the Roaring Twenties in the U.S.' Today, they argue that the United States, Canada, the UK and Australia (added in the second report) are all plutonomies powered by the differential gains made by the wealthiest 1% of income earners or in their words: 'the rich now dominate income, wealth and spending in these countries' (Citigroup 2006: 1) . Their evidence for this claim is based on empirical research that shows the income share of the top 1% in these countries rising rapidly from the late 1980s to 2002 (Citigroup 2005: 6) .
But what is the main driver of this trend?
According to the report, there are six: 1) technology enhancing productivity, 2) financial innovation, 3) cooperative governments favourable to capitalism, 4) immigration and 'overseas conquests', 5) the rule of law, and 6) patented inventions. 17 They go on to argue that plutonomies have reshaped the global consumption map and therefore a change in our traditional thinking is required:
In a plutonomy there is no such animal as 'the U.S. consumer' or 'the UK consumer', or indeed the 'Russian consumer'. There are rich consumers, few in number, but disproportionate in the gigantic slice of income and consumption they take. There are the rest, the 'non-rich', the multitudinous many, but only accounting for surprisingly small bites of the national pie (Citigroup 2005: 2) .
What this passage suggests is that for the equity strategists at Citigroup, there are only two types of people: rich consumers and a 'multitudinous many'. Indeed, likely stealing a page from their hero Ayn Rand, the report claims that 'the earth is being held up by the muscular arms of its entrepreneur-plutocrats, like it, or not' (Citigroup 2005: 1) . Meanwhile, the multitude has such a low share of overall income in plutonomies that they cannot be key drivers of increasing demand -particularly for most luxury goods. But the authors recognize that the extreme polarization of income and wealth may not be sustainable and they question how societies may 'disrupt plutonomy' by expropriating wealth at the top of the income pyramid (Citigroup 2005: 22) . The authors argue that expropriation can take two main forms: government taxation and tampering with property rights. However, while they understand the potential for a social backlash that may force politicians to raise taxes on the wealthiest 1% or infringe upon some of their property rights, the report largely discounts the immediate potential for such moves based on the evidence that, at the time of their writing, there were few political and social events that signalled rising popular discontent. One of the potential reasons for this, suggests the report, is that 'enough of the electorate' in plutonomies 'believe they have a chance of becoming a Pluto-participant. Why kill it off, if you can join it?' (Citigroup 2005: 24) . Whether there is some truth to the idea that people consent to plutonomy because one day they fancy themselves joining the .2% of high net worth individuals is of course debateable. But the far more interesting point the report makes is what investors can do with their analysis of growing income inequality.
If the wealthy have much more to spend in plutonomies than their lesser counterparts on fixed or relatively stagnant incomes, the report reasons that equity investors should target those publically listed companies that cater to the global wealthy. Or in their colourful words: 'there is…a more refined way to play plutonomy, and this is to buy shares in the companies that make the toys that the Plutonomists enjoy' (Citigroup 2005: 25) . What is more, the authors of the report argue that the global rich prefer Giffen goods. Giffen goods are goods that people consume more of the more expensive they become. So rather than soaring prices becoming a deterrent to demand, they are actually a powerful signal to the rich to acquire such goods. Towards this end, Citigroup identified a representative menu of equities from companies whose earnings are almost exclusively generated from high net worth individuals. Calling it the 'plutonomy basket', there are 24 suggested securities in the index (weighed equally) ranging from the automobile maker Porsche to the private banking house of Julius Baer.
Tracing the index back to 1985 and comparing it with the MSCI AC World Index the authors found 'a handsome outperformance' (Citigroup 2005: 28 We can perhaps see why one of the conclusions of the report is that 'there are rich consumers, and there are the rest. The rich are getting richer…and they dominate consumption' (Citigroup 2005: 30) . However before exploring some dimensions of conspicuous consumption in the New Gilded Age, I want to briefly consider the age that gave rise to Veblen's concept. What this passage suggests is not only did the newly affluent compete to display their wealth by building private dwellings of gigantic and opulent proportions, but they also desired to emulate (and in many cases outdo) the grand mansions and estates of a feudal Europe. 
Conspicuous Consumption in the First Gilded Age

Differential Consumption in the New Gilded Age
Richistanis like to flaunt their wealth. And never before have so many flaunted so much. (Frank 2007: 120) .
History has rarely seen an era win which so much money has been made by so few
people in such a short amount of time. (Taylor et al. 2009: 4) . Moreover, the study revealed that 'the top 1 per cent own almost 40 times as much as the bottom 50 per cent' with a massive gap between those in the top decile and those at the lowest decile. According to the authors of the report, the top decile has 13,000 times more wealth than those at the very bottom of the wealth pyramid (Davies et al. 2006: 26) .
If the first Gilded Age was distinctly
In the available literature most attempts to account for this massive private accumulation of wealth rely on a number of explanations. However, while rationalizations abound, there appears to be little consensus on the precise origins of this wealth boom, let alone a convincing ethical or philosophical justification for such obscene levels of accumulation and inequality. Dominant explanations include the following -either isolated or in combination:
the levering of technological change, the deregulation of finance, globalization, effort, hard work and luck, rewards for special knowledge or skills, liquidity events and the growth in hedge funds run by 'super-intelligent' human beings. These explanations are all quite common in the popular press Taylor et al. 2009: 21ff; Freeland 2012 ). But at a more general level some commentators make the distinction between the 'self-made' affluent and dominant owners that inherited their fortune. To some extent, the latter category is viewed as less deserved than their newly minted affluent counterparts that are said to have made their fortunes without assistance of any kind -for what else can 'self-made' mean? A full assessment of this argument using the capital as power framework and complemented by a litany of further evidence cannot be countenanced here since my purpose in this section is to explore some of the dimension of differential consumption in the New Gilded Age (Veblen 1904; Johnston 2005a; Johnston 2005b Johnston , 2007 Johnston , 2012 Shachar 2009; Daly 2008, 2010; Shaxson 2010; Kaufmann and Vicente 2011; Bichler, Nitzan and Di Muzio 2012; Farnsworth 2013) . 33 I will have to leave this evaluation for a future study but I believe it is one of the most crucial arguments political economy has to come to terms with if it is to critically challenge the social reproduction of extreme affluence.
Let's begin with a prescient observation. One of the main arguments in the popular literature advanced by Kempf (2008 : 50) Frank (2007 and Freeland (2012) and recognized by
Citigroup's plutonomy thesis is that dominant owners have created a 'self-contained world unto their own' (Frank 2007: 3) . Frank calls this virtual world Richistan. In this world, the affluent have 'their own health-care system (concierge doctors), travel network (NetJets, destination clubs), separate economy (double-digit income gains and double-digit inflation), and language (Who's your household manager?) (Frank 2007: 3) . We could add to this 'virtual world' their own clubs and associations (e.g. MetCircle Networking with a net US$ 100 million dollar membership cut-off), psychological concerns (sudden wealth syndrome, spoiled children), built environments (mansions, private islands, sea-steading), vehicles (e.g. $10,838,000 2% Helicopter/Sikorsky S-76D $15,500,00 5% Caviar/Tsar Imperial 1 kilo $13,600 0
The cheapest item on the full list is a subscription to Forbes at US$ 60 while the most expensive item listed is the Sikorsky helicopter at US$ 14.8 million. But while these items
give us an idea of the luxury goods and services the affluent consume, many of the items listed are only benchmarks, while other goods and services the mega-rich consume are not listed. For example, I will consider the arms race in yachts along with the boom in private submarine sales.
Without a doubt, the Hatteras 80 MY is a luxury yacht boasting an overall length of 79 feet, 10 inches. But while the yacht may look impressive to most, it doesn't come close to the global fleet of mega-yachts. Writing in Forbes magazine, the editor of Boat International spelled out the current trend:
When we at "Boat International" first produced our Register, back in 1990, superyachting was still in relative infancy. Indeed, to get on the Top 100 list in 1990, your yacht needed to be just 147 feet in length (44.8 metres). Nowadays, your yacht would have to measure at least 240 feet in length (73 metres). That entry point is set to rise again in 2013, with 12 new yachts due to be delivered in the coming months, all of which will make the updated Top 100 list, knocking out a dozen smaller ones, and raising the bar to 246 feet (75 metres) (Thomas 2012) .
How long the race to build the world's largest private yacht will go on is anyone's guess.
Currently the world's largest super-yacht is the Eclipse at 533 feet long and two inches. It is only slightly bigger than the yacht called Dubai, measured at 531 feet, 6 inches and owned by Sheik Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum -the head of the 'royal' family of Dubai and Prime Minister and Vice President of the United Arab Emirates. Eclipse is owned by Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich and features two pools, a submarine, 18 luxury suites for up to 36 guests, three helipads, three launch boats, a working crew of 92, armour plating and bullet proof glass. If this isn't enough, the yacht also features a German-crafted missile defence system. And this is not Abramovich's only yacht; he owns four others. This figure does not include Clive Palmer, the Australian mining multi-millionaire's plan to build a replica of the Titanic. 38 So even amidst the global financial crisis and the age of austerity politics, the conspicuous consumption of yachts continues.
And there are some early signs that it is moving on to private luxury submarines.
Currently, there are an estimated 100 private submarines cruising the world's vast oceans. Called Antilia after a mythical island in the Atlantic, Ambani's 27 story residence towers above Mumbai. The residence has 400,000 square feet of living space, 3 helipads, 9 high speed elevators, underground parking for 168 cars, a gym, swimming pool, movie theatre, spa, dance studio, balconies with gardens, an unknown number of guest rooms, a ballroom, snack bar and one entire floor dedicated to servicing Ambani's private fleet of luxury cars.
Ambani's six member family (including his mother) will inhabit the top six floors of the 27 story building. Antilia is also staffed by an estimated 600 people catering to the needs of the family and their guests. At an estimated US$ 1-2 billion dollars, it is not only the world's largest private residence, but also its most expensive. The residence is also built in a country where the average Indian urban dweller occupies 504 square feet of space and 33% live in less space than US prisoners. 42 In other words, Ambani's home has 794 times more living space than the average Indian. But then again, Ambani is not status-seeking with the average Indian but with the global billionaire class of which he is a part.
There are of course countless other examples of conspicuous consumption as dominant owners make ever greater returns on the income-generating assets they own. However brief, this sketch suggests that dominant owners aim to consume differentially and that these displays of consumption are primarily aimed at intraclass emulation and status-seeking.
Having highlighted this secondary drive as equally important to the symbolic accumulation of money, I now move to the second part of my argument as first identified by Kempf - (Veblen 1899 (Veblen /2007 From the effects of global warming to the recorded loss of biodiversity, the evidence of populations coming under stress or devastation due to unsustainable anthropocentric practices continues to mount (Dauvergne 2008; Barry 2012; Newell 2012 To escape any re-evaluation, the oligarchy keeps repeating the dominant ideology according to which the solution to the social crisis is production growth. That is supposedly the sole means of fighting poverty and unemployment. Growth would allow the overall level of wealth to rise and consequently improve the lot of the poor without -and this part is never spelled out -any need to modify the distribution of wealth (2008: 70).
The main problem with the growth hypothesis identified here is that it deflects our attention away from a local and global conversation about the distribution and redistribution of income, wealth and power. Other problems with the growth hypothesis include; 1) there is little evidence that beyond a certain point, economic growth contributes to human happiness (Jackson 2009: 30ff) ; 2) economic growth has been tightly correlated with non-renewable fossil fuel consumption (Tverberg 2011) and; 3) there are physical limits to many of the world's resources and evidence is mounting that we are reaching those limits (Heinberg 2007 What I want to make clear in this conclusion is that this study of the plutonomy is not just about the rich going shopping and through my description of some of their activitiesentering their world for a brief period. It is about capital as a mode of power and the ways in which this power is demonstrated symbolically and materially by an extremely small minority of the planet's inhabitants. Dominant owners have created a separate world for themselves where they are largely insulated from the everyday life concerns of the majority of humanity. In fact a small minority of the rich and uncritical followers of Ayn Rand and Milton Friedman are pushing an idea called sea-steading. The idea is to build cities for the .2% and their friends out in the ocean so that they can be free of societal regulation and government taxation once and for all. 44 Though this is an extreme example and perhaps a dream unlikely to be realized, it does demonstrate a certain mindset that borders on childlike egotism and anti-social behaviour, not to mention a crypto-social Darwinism that equates wealth with superiority and individuated genius rather than luck, chance, positionality, the degree of knowledge in a society or how this gets privately appropriated.
In an increasingly plutonomic world so incredibly divided by wealth and life chances (and recall that the trend is intensifying) critical political economists do well to continue to challenge the logic, politics and ethics that reproduce such incredible affluence and the concentration of power in ever fewer hands. As hinted above, future research might also ask how far and in what ways it can really be said that this tiny minority 'made' or 'deserve' their wealth? And if, as some scholars argue (Veblen 1904; Alperovitz and Daly 2008; Nitzan and Bichler 2009 ), they do not, how the 99% might organize itself politically to challenge current patters of capitalization and ownership? While the capital as power approach already suggests an answer, such an analysis will have to wait for another time. In the meantime, for those concerned with social justice, ethics and basic human rights, a good place to start challenging the rule of the .2% might be a sustained global discussion on the logic of capital as power and how the ordering and reordering of social reproduction for the purpose of symbolic power and status-seeking consumption is fundamentally unethical, unjust, unfair and most of all, unnecessary (Bichler, Nitzan and Di Muzio 2012) .
